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Reining in the Rogue Squadron:
Making Sense of the “Original Source”
Exception for Qui Tam Relators
Dayna Bowen Matthew *
“The qui tam provisions offset inadequate law enforcement
resources and encouraged ‘a rogue to catch a rogue’ by
inducing informers ‘to betray [their] coconspirators.’” 1

Christopher Alexion has provided me a welcome opportunity
to revisit the Civil False Claims Act (FCA) 2 and its qui tam
provision. I have long found the qui tam provision problematic.
However, in Open the Door, Not the Floodgates, Mr. Alexion
provides an insightful and well-organized overview of the public
disclosure provision that calls for a fresh look at how courts
should enforce this jurisdictional bar, in order to curb the abusive
prosecution this statute invites. 3
Alexion focuses on the struggle federal courts and Congress
have had with one of the statute’s most important protections
against parasitic litigation by qui tam relators—the jurisdictional
public disclosure bar. He offers a proposal to narrowly construe
the most recent revision of this restriction, hoping, I believe, to
head off yet another spate of contradictory and irreconcilable
constructions of the FCA statute. Further, Alexion’s proposal is
directed, as the title to his Note suggests, at supporting
Congress’s most recent attempt to limit the number of specious
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. J.D., University of
Virginia Law School; A.B., Harvard-Radcliffe College.
1. U.S. ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Emp. Club, 105 F.3d 675, 679 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955–56 (1863)).
2. See An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the Government of the
United States, ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (current version at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729–33 (2010)) (providing for civil actions for false claims).
3. See Christopher M. Alexion, Note, Open the Door, Not the Floodgates:
Controlling Qui Tam Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 69 WASH & LEE L.
REV. 365, 368 (2012) (arguing for a narrow construction of the “original source”
exception to the FCA’s public disclosure bar).
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lawsuits qui tam plaintiffs bring, while protecting the rights of
worthy private litigants who prosecute fraud on behalf of the
government. Mr. Alexion’s efforts are matched against the
government’s commitment to an aggressive prosecutorial strategy
built on the premise that the qui tam provision allows the state to
“use a rogue to catch a rogue.” 4 The upshot of this policy is that
the vast numbers of qui tam rogues now mobilized in the fight
against fraud have, I fear, grown as powerful as the fictional
“Rogue Squadron” from the Star Wars movies, books, and comics.
However, unlike their science fiction counterparts, the evidence
suggests that the targets of qui tam rogues are not always evil
empires, the qui tam rogue’s aim is not always sharp and true,
and these rogues are not always “the best pilots and the best
fighters.” 5 In contrast to the fictional Galactic Empire heroes, all
too often, qui tam rogues are just plain rogues. The basic idea
behind the public disclosure bar is to stop unworthy rogues before
they do reckless and expensive harm, but to allow truly helpful
ones to proceed.
The public disclosure bar operates to exclude qui tam relators
from recovering damages under the FCA if they do not disclose
fraudulent conduct that was previously hidden from public view.
The “original source” exception to the public disclosure bar makes
room for the qui tam relator who is, in fact, the informant behind
the public disclosure, to recover her share of damages recovered
under the FCA. Mr. Alexion has identified three different
approaches courts have taken to construing the original source
exception to the public disclosure bar. 6
4. Findley, 105 F.3d at 679 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS.
955–56).
5. The Rogue Squadron, also known as the “Red Squadron” and the
“Rogue Group” is the band of X-wing pilots, originally headed by Wedge Antilles,
that Luke Skywalker famously joined in the two successful attacks against
Darth Vader’s Death Stars I and II, in A NEW HOPE (Lucasfilm 1977) and
RETURN OF THE JEDI (Lucasfilm 1983). See STEPHEN J. SANSWEET, STAR WARS
ENCYCLOPEDIA 252 (1998) (providing background on Rogue Squadron).
6. The relevant language is as follows:
(4)(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section,
unless opposed by the Government, if substantially the same
allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were
publicly disclosed—
(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the
Government or its agent is a party;
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Mr. Alexion calls the First and Fourth Circuits’ rule the
“Permissive Approach” because plaintiffs can qualify as the
original source of a public disclosure, and thus overcome the
jurisdictional bar, more easily under this rule than under any
other. 7 In the First Circuit, the Permissive Approach turns on the
timing of the relator’s disclosure. That rule bars recovery only to
relators who fail to disclose the facts of fraud prior to filing their
qui tam lawsuit. From a timing perspective, plaintiffs do not have
to share their knowledge of fraud with the government before the
relevant facts become public from other sources. In United States
ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Products, L.P., 8 for example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded the
statute “only requires that a relator provide his or her
information prior to the filing of the qui tam suit.” 9 Thus, the fact
that relator Duxbury filed his qui tam action “hot on the heels” 10
of a master consolidated, multi-district complaint containing
similar allegations, did not bar his claim. In the Fourth Circuit,
the Permissive Approach turns on the content of the qui tam
disclosure. The court in United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton
Dickinson & Co. took the Permissive Approach to determine the
content of the qui tam suit was not “derived from” a public
disclosure, even though the relator’s brother and their shared
(ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other
Federal report, hearing, audit, or investigation; or
(iii) from the news media,
unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an
individual who either (i) prior to a public disclosure under subsection
(e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the information
on which allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (2) who
has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the
publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has
voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing
an action under this section.
31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e) (West 2011).
7. See Alexion, supra note 3, text accompanying notes 96–141 (discussing
the approach taken by the First and Fourth Circuits).
8. See U.S. ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 21
(1st Cir. 2009) (finding that the qui tam relator qualified as an original source).
9. Id. at 28.
10. Id. at 17.
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company had filed and settled a civil action against the same
defendant, making the same allegations about overcharging the
government for the same medical device products. 11
Interestingly, in contrast to Duxbury and Siller, the cases
that Mr. Alexion uses to explain what he calls the “Restrictive
Approach” do not involve health care defendants. 12 Plaintiffs in
courts adopting this approach have a more difficult time
qualifying as original sources and less often successfully
overcome the public disclosure bar. Mr. Alexion calls the Second
and Ninth Circuits’ rule the “Restrictive Approach” because it
allows recovery only to qui tam plaintiffs who not only provide
their information voluntarily to the government before filing, but
who also are the initial source of the relevant information to the
entity that publicly disclosed the fraud. Disclosing to the
government alone is not enough. In United States ex rel. Dick v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 13 the relator was barred because he
was not the source of the earlier-filed allegations in a RICO classaction suit against the defendants. 14 The court was impressed
that the qui tam plaintiff did not provide any information to the
earlier plaintiffs. 15 On the other hand, the court in United States
11. See U.S. ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1355
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that “a qui tam plaintiff need not be a source to the
entity that publicly disclosed the allegations on which the qui tam action is
based in order to be an original source under section 3730(e)(4)(B)”).
12. See Alexion, supra note 3, text accompanying notes 142–69 (discussing
the approach taken by the Second and Ninth Circuits). An empirical study could
be constructed to confirm my instinct that the majority of cases that employ the
“Permissive Approach” to the original source exception involve health care
defendants, while the majority of cases applying the “Restrictive Approach” are
unrelated to the health care industry. Uncovering such a pattern would support
a conclusion that even courts play an unwitting role in ensuring that one
significant driver in the burgeoning of the health care fraud prosecution
business is the lucrative recovery that qui tam plaintiffs and the government
reap, not solely the determination to stamp out fraud in this particular industry.
13. See U.S. ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 18 (2d
Cir. 1990) (holding that “if the information on which a qui tam suit is based is in
the public domain, and the qui tam plaintiff was not a source of that
information, then the suit is barred”).
14. Id. at 16 (“Appellants assert . . . that since they were ‘original sources,’
their suit may be maintained notwithstanding the fact that it is based upon
publicly disclosed allegations. Based upon our review of the evidence presented
and our interpretation of the applicable statute, we do not agree.”).
15. Id. at 18 (noting a need to discourage “persons with relevant
information from remaining silent and encourage them to report such
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ex rel. Wang v. FMC Corp. 16 was unimpressed by the fact that,
there, the qui tam relator in 1983 had acquired direct and
independent knowledge of the allegations and transactions he
later sued upon in 1987. In the interim, those allegations had
been publicly disclosed in the media before Wang’s qui tam suit
was filed. 17
According to Mr. Alexion, the “Middle Ground” belongs to the
Sixth and D.C. Circuits, which do not require the relator to be the
original source of the initial leak to any disclosing entity in order
to recover but do insist that the qui tam relator is the source of
information not already “widely disseminated” before their
filing. 18 The Middle Ground courts focus on whether an original
source adds information to inspire the government to investigate,
uncover, and prosecute previously hidden fraud.
The beauty of Mr. Alexion’s tripartite description is that it
creates a framework to understand all attempts to reform the
public disclosure bar and the related original source exception,
including the most recent reform enacted under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA). Alexion
helps us to see that the construction of these FCA provision turns
on understanding three variables: the timing, the content, and
the recipient of the qui tam relator’s disclosures. The following
table summarizes the lessons that Mr. Alexion’s “PermissiveMiddle-Restrictive” model teaches:

information at the earliest possible time”).
16. See Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1420 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that “[b]ecause he had no hand in the original public disclosure of [fraud],
Wang’s claim . . . is blocked by the jurisdictional bar of section 3730(e)(4)(A)”).
17. Id. at 1418 (“[S]omeone else publicly disclosed the [relevant] problems.
Wang is now revealing what is already publicly known.”).
18. See Alexion, supra note 3, text accompanying notes 170–204 (discussing
the approach taken by the D.C. and Sixth Circuits).
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Applying Alexion’s “Permissive-Middle-Restrictive” Model to
Understand the Public Disclosure Bar

Timing of
Relator’s
Disclosure

Content of
Relator’s
Disclosure

Recipient of
Relator’s
Disclosure

Permissive
Middle
Restrictive
(1st, 4th
(D.C., 6th (2d, 9th Cir.)
Cir.)
Cir.)
Before filing Before public Before public
qui tam
disclosure
disclosure
OR
action
Prior to filing
AND
qui tam
action

PPACA
(2010)
Before a public
disclosure
OR
Prior to filing
qui tam action
IF

May not be
Must be new Must be the
Information
“derived from” discoveries
allegations and materially adds
or “based
not widely
transactions in to the case
upon” prior known. Must the initial leak based on
disclosure
introduce new to entity that relator’s
elements of first publicly independent
wrongful
disclosed
knowledge
transactions
or material
elements to
transaction
publicly
disclosed
Government Government

Disclosing
Entity

H.B. 1788
(Not enacted)

Government

May be any
essential
element not
made public
or broadly
disseminated

Government

Alexion rightly finds the evidence of parasitic qui tam actions
“alarming” and concludes his Note by proposing a “narrow”
reading of the revised public disclosure bar exception outlined in
the PPACA. 19 I believe he is right to try to get out in front of the
courts on construing PPACA’s version of the original source
exception. First, the most current numbers are even worse than
those that Mr. Alexion found “alarming.” The number of qui tam
filings is at an all-time high. In 2010, relators filed the largest
number of new matters—574—ever initiated since the 1986
Amendment to the Civil False Claims Act was passed. 20
19. See Alexion, supra note 3, text accompanying notes 218–59 (arguing for
a narrow construction of the 2010 amendments to the original source exception).
20. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS: OVERVIEW 2, available at
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf.
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Moreover, if Mr. Alexion is right to use the low rate at which the
government elects to intervene in qui tam actions as a proxy for
the high number of low-quality lawsuits filed, then the fact that
in 2010 the Department of Justice reported it intervened “in
fewer than 25% of cases filed” including those it settled, raises
concern about the tremendous waste of judicial resources
unworthy qui tam lawsuits represent. 21 And Mr. Alexion’s alarm
is further justified by the overwhelming extent to which health
care cases have become the singular focus of qui tam prosecution.
I believe Mr. Alexion has identified a very practical and costly
problem that requires careful judicial construction to repair.
However, I have more confidence in the recently enacted
reforms to the original source exception than Mr. Alexion does. I
am less concerned than Mr. Alexion that courts will find the
second prong of PPACA’s language—which defines an original
source as one “who has knowledge that is independent of and
materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or
transactions and who has voluntarily provided the information to
the government prior to filing an action under this section” 22—
unclear. While defining these terms statutorily would have
greatly reduced uncertainty, cases construing earlier versions of
the original source exception have considered terms closely
related to the “independent knowledge” 23 and “materially adds” 24
provisions in PPACA’s new statute. They will be helpful. Most
importantly, PPACA clarifies the timing, content, and recipient
requirements for qui tam plaintiffs. Now relators know they
either must speak to the government before public disclosures, or
21. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES: GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION IN QUI TAM (WHISTLEBLOWER) SUITS 2, available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/Civil_Division/InternetWhistleblower%20updat
e.pdf.
22. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (West 2011).
23. The Duxbury court construed the following language in the 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(3)(4)(B) as controlling in 2009: “A relator qualifies as an ‘original source’
if (1) she has ‘direct and independent knowledge’ of the information supporting
her claims and (2) she ‘provided the information to the Government before filing
an action.’” U.S. ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 16
(1st Cir. 2009) cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3454 (2010).
24. See In re Natural Gas Royalties Qui Tam Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 1117,
1130 (D. Wyo. 2006) (discussing whether a relator “brings something of real
value to the table”).
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must materially add to prior public disclosures if they wait to
speak after those disclosures, but before filing. Referring to the
chart above demonstrates that the PPACA amendment addresses
and clarifies the timing, content, and recipient questions that
have split courts’ analyses of the original source exception since
1986. Yet, while PPACA may have shed considerable light on
these three issues, many important questions remain
unanswered.
Fundamentally, an open question remains as to whether the
growing use of qui tam relators under FCA is actually decreasing
the incidence of fraud or even deterring future fraud, rather than
merely increasing litigation costs and the recoveries flowing from
the mere allegations of fraud. The importance of this unanswered
question cannot be overstated. The government’s announcement
that in 2010 it recovered over $3 billion in judgments and
settlements against those accused of fraud under the FCA 25 must
not be misunderstood to represent the number of ill-gotten
dollars that have been returned to public coffers. The impressive
$3 billion figure does not measure the amount or extent of
fraudulent conduct that has been stopped because of FCA
litigation. Primarily, this dollar figure measures the amount that
defendants accused of fraud were willing to pay in order to make
the prosecution against them cease. Moreover, knowing that $2.5
billion of that total came from cases alleging health care fraud
says little (and perhaps nothing) about the changes in healthdelivery practice or reductions in fraudulent conduct that
resulted from the multi-billion-dollar collection.
In fact, it would be worthwhile to examine closely what is
driving qui tam plaintiffs’—and the government’s—focus on fraud
in the health care industry particularly. If, as others have
observed about bank robbers, qui tam plaintiffs direct their
attention to health care prosecution merely because that “is
where the money is,”26 I am left to wonder whether other
25. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Recovers $3
Billion in False Claims Cases in Fiscal Year 2010 (Nov. 22, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-civ-1335.html (last visited Jan.
23, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See Pamela H. Bucy, Crimes by Health Care Providers, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REV. 589, 589 (“As Willie Sutton said when asked why he robbed a bank,
‘[T]hat’s where the money is.’”).
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fraudulent conduct in industries such as securities, defense, and
construction is receiving too little attention and therefore
imposing too great a cost on the American public and economy.
Finally, it would be a worthwhile exercise to quantify a concrete
assessment of the cost of relying upon qui tam relators to uncover
fraud and compare those costs to the actual benefits derived from
this prosecutorial approach. 27
While these questions are well outside the scope of Mr.
Alexion’s public disclosure analysis, the fact that they remain
open may, in part, have motivated Congress to sharpen the
definition of an original source as part of the health care reform
act of 2010. By limiting the timing and content of disclosures that
allow a qui tam relator to avoid the public disclosure bar,
Congress may indeed have closed the “floodgates.” However, by
creating two separate alternative routes to qualify as an original
source and by allowing relators to share information with either
the government or the disclosing entity, Congress has left an
“open door” to legitimate qui tam litigants. Courts’ construction of
the new original source exception will have to be aggressive—
tolerating no derivative claims—and, “narrow” as Mr. Alexion
suggests, in order to bring consistency to enforcing the public
disclosure bar. But to rein in the proliferation of parasitic
lawsuits filed by the virtual squadron of qui tam relators who
appeared in courts across the country last year, judges will have
to aggressively construe the materiality requirement Congress
has added to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). Indeed, Mr. Alexion’s
proposal to allow only those relators who share “valuable”
information that “substantially assists” the government to
proceed is a conceptual step in the right direction.

27. See, e.g., Jeffery Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of
Immigration Enforcement, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 889 (describing qualitatively
the compliance and social costs of using qui tam relators under the False Claims
Act).

